Someone posted a link to the report at our forum, simaqianstudio.com, so, if you don’t mind, I will quote my own reply from that discussion:

The team needed someone with good command in spoken Russian. The first screenshot at page 12, both screenshots at page 13, the screenshot at page 22 do not contain any information directly referring to the attacks on Georgian resources. So, the text at page 22 simply describes a way to hide your physical location when using GPRS to hack a computer (which is still a crime even in Russia). Screenshots at page 13 include the text of articles discussing the methods of breaking popular Russian social networks, vkontakte.ru and odnoklassniki.ru.

OPSOS is not exactly a “system that records and stores call connection information”, but just a cell phone service provider.

xakep.ru is the web-site of a popular Russian magazine for wannabe hackorz, and that the access not blocked for the visitors with US-based IP-addresses may be explained by the commercial nature of the web-site, which is often visited by Russians living in other countries. Xakep.ru is not specifically patriotic or nationalist resource.

The texts with instructions on attacking Georgian resources are quite primitive. Using ‘ping’ or some trivial tools like DoSHTTP doesn’t really seem to be what government-sponsored cyber-soldiers might use.

Some time ago we discussed similar attacks of Russian hackers on Estonian resources: Eu Says Russia Must Honor Contracts With Estonia. In that thread, I gave links to some posts in LiveJournal with the instructions to use ‘ping’ to run DDoS attacks.

Here’s a couple of articles on the attacks on Estonian resources:
Cyberattack in Estonia–what it really means
Student behind DoS attack that rekindled bad Soviet memories

PS: But I find it very probable that some political parties (specifically, LDPR) played a role in organizing these attacks. I’m not sure, though, if such involvement may be classified as the government sponsorship.